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Abstract: This paper follows Gely and Spiller (1989a) in modeling the Supreme Court
as a self-interested, ideologically motivated actor, making decisions subject to the
constraints imposed by the other political institutions of government, namely, the two
houses of Congress and the President. We expand this framework to analyze the
determinants of Supreme Court constitutional decisions. We show that even though the
Supreme Court has substantial discretion in its interpretation of the constitution,
the Supreme Court will also follow the electorate. The extent and speed by which the
Court follows the electorate, however, depends on how unified Congress and the State
Legislatures are on the issue at hand, and also on the Court's own ideological
preferences. Finally, we apply this framework to analyze the Supreme Court's change,
in 1937, of its interpretation of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
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I. Introduction
Supreme Court constitutional decisions are perhaps the most powerful way of designing
public policy. While a President may veto Congressional legislation, or Congress may
reverse a Supreme Court statutory decision, the reversal of a Supreme Court
constitutional decision requires an explicit constitutional amendment. Constitutional
amendments have to be ratified by the State Legislatures, and can be initiated either
by Congress or by the State Legislatures. Until this date, however, all amendments to
the US Constitution have been initiated by Congress. Clause V of the US Constitution
requires that constitutional amendments initiated by Congress should have the support
of two thirds of each house, and to be ratified, amendments must have the support of
at least three-fourths of the State Legislatures. 1 Constitutional amendments, then,
demand a substantial political consensus and consequently, are not easily
implemented. 2 The difficulties in achieving a political consensus to overturn a
Supreme Court constitutional decision suggest that the Supreme Court may have
substantial discretion in the interpretation of the Constitution, and, furthermore,
that changes in the ideological composition of the Supreme Court may have a large
impact on Supreme Court decisions.
In this paper we develop a theory of Supreme Court constitutional decisions
following the approach of Gely and Spiller (1989a, 1989b) . There the Supreme Court is
modeled as a self-interested, politically motivated actor. The Court is seen
undertaking its decisions based not on the traditional rules of legal precedent, but
1 In most congressional proposals, Congress imposes the condition that the
amendment be ratified within a certain period of time (Nowak, et al., p. 1104).
2 Wasby (1988, p. 307), however, points that the "Eleventh, Sixteenth, and
Twenty-sixth Amendments, as well as the post-Civil War amendments on slavery and the
status of blacks -- all initiated by Congress-- were passed to override Court
decisions." Thus, Supreme Court constitutional decisions are clearly reversible,
albeit under the right circumstances.
rather on a self-interested political calculus, constrained only by the political
interests and structures of the other institutions of government, namely Congress and
the President. While the framework abstracts from many important institutional
features of the Supreme Court, its predictions seem to conform to much of the
conventional wisdom about the workings of the Supreme Court, and about the relative
power of the different political institutions. For example, Gely and Spiller (1989a)
show that, holding its composition constant, the Supreme Court will usually follow the
electorate in making its statutory decisions, even though the Court is not subject to
interest groups nor to direct political pressure.
In this paper we explore the theory of constitutional decisions, using the same
type of behavioral assumptions about the Supreme Court and the other political actors
as used in Gely and Spiller (1989b) for the analysis of statutory decisions. 3 We
find, that, our theory is consistent also with much of the intuition concerning the
degree of discretion the Supreme Court has when undertaking constitutional decisions.
Our theory, predicts, however, that the Supreme Court, independently of its own
ideological composition, will also follow the electorate in its constitutional
decisions. The extent and speed by which the Court follows the electorate, however,
Our approach differs from previous analyses of the Supreme Court in that we
develop an analytical model of the interaction between the Supreme Court and the
different institutions of government. Previous approaches to the Supreme Court have
been mostly normative, focusing mostly on what rules should the Supreme Court follow
in undertaking its decisions. In particular, there is a long-standing debate about
whether the Court must follow an "activist" or "restrained" path. See, for example,
Forte (1972), Halpern and Lamb (1982). Our approach, instead is positive. We analyze
the incentives that the Supreme Court has in making constitutional decisions. Perhaps
the classic positive analysis of the Court is that of Dahl (1957), who suggests that,
because of their recruitment, the Justices are a reflection of the electorate. Dahl's
hypothesis is rooted in the "decision-making" models of the Court (see Sheldon
(1974)), where the Court is seen as independent of the remaining parts of the
political system. See also Funston (1975), Handberg and Hill (1980) and (1984) for
related interpretations. See, on the other hand, Adamany (1973), who claims that the
Court constitute a force for instability. See, also Casper (1976). For surveys of
the different approaches to the analysis of the Supreme Court (see Rohde and Spaeth
(1976), Sheldon (1974), Halpern and Lamb (1982) and Wasby (1988)).
depends on how unified the houses of Congress and the State Legislatures are
concerning the issue at hand, and also on the actual ideological composition of the
Court.
After developing the theory, we analyze a major change in the Supreme Court
interpretation of the constitution, namely, the reversal, in 1937, of its previous
interpretation of the Commerce clause of the Constitution. Until 1937 the court used
that interpretation to base its decisions on the unconstitutionality of most New Deal
regulatory measures. While most previous explanations offered for this change in the
position of the Supreme Court point towards Roosevelt's "court packing plan," they are
unsatisfactory, since they do not take into account that the Court reversed itself
before the court packing plan was announced, and furthermore, that its own reversal,
as predicted by our model, was closely linked to the 1936 election results that
provided, for the first time, a realistic threat of a constitutional amendment
actually being enacted.
II. The Model
The model to be developed in this section is very simple. We abstract from the rich
personal history of the Court, and instead focus on a stripped-down model of
bargaining among our four political actors: the House of Representatives, the Senate,
the State Legislatures and the Supreme Court.
Our first assumption concerns the composition and preferences of those bodies. To
simplify our analysis we assume that each of those institutions can be represented as
a single individual. Thus, for a constitutional amendment to be passed, the House,
the Senate and the State Legislatures have to approve such a move.* If one of those
institutions do not approve of the amendment, the amendment fails, and the
* As discussed above all amendments to the Constitution have been initiated in
Congress. Thus, we assume that to be the only relevant method of amending the
Constitution.
constitutional status-quo stands. We assume also that all actors have stable and
strictly convex preferences in the policy space (R2 ) . Let H, S, SL, and SC represent
the ideal points of the House, the Senate, the State Legislatures and the Supreme
Court in the policy space. 5 That politicians have preferences over particular aspects
of policies is not a surprising assumption. Our assumption about Supreme Court
justices' preferences requires, however, further explanation. Supreme Court justices
are appointed through a political process, with the President nominating and the
Senate approving the nomination. Through that process the preferences of the
candidate are examined. It is reasonable to expect that both Congress and the
President will prefer the potential justice to have particular, but not necessarily
the same, ideological preferences, and will reject candidates either with the wrong or
extremely erratic preferences. Once appointed, however, justices are not subject to
direct political pressure from interest groups as are Congressmen. 6 As a consequence,
justices could, in principle, vote their own ideologies, while Congressmen have to be
more attuned to the interests of their constituencies. 7 In other words, the source of
the preferences of the Supreme Court is basically ideological, while that of
legislators is more the result of their constituents' political demands.
Our second assumption concerns the role of the Supreme Court in making
5 We assume that each actor can be represented as a single individual. As long
as the issue at hand is single -dimensional, however, whether the legislative bodies
are composed by a single individual or by many is inconsequential for analytical
purposes, as long as individuals have convex preferences. Once the issue is
multidimensional, however, institutional features have to be introduced to avoid
voting cycles. See Denzau and Mackay (1981) and the literature on structure -induced-
equilibria. For structure- induced equilibria analyses of Congressional institutions
see Shepsle (1979), and Shepsle and Weingast (1981,1982 and 1987).
The role of interest groups in the judicial process is limited to their
participation as litigants in cases where they might be directly involved, or, to the
filing of "amicus briefs" in cases in which they might have interests at stake.
Several authors have analyzed the role of public opinion on Supreme Court
decisions. See, for example, Caldeira (1987), and references therein.
constitutional interpretations. A constitutional decision by the Supreme Court
becomes part of the law as long as the other three actors do not reverse the decision,
that is, as long as the three legislative bodies do not agree on a constitutional
amendment. The bargaining process, then, is as follows. The Supreme Court makes a
constitutional decision. That decision becomes the new constitutional interpretation
that will take effect as long as Congress and the State Legislatures do not reverse
it. If the legislators reverse the Supreme Court decision, their interpretation then
becomes the law. 8
Feasible Constitutional Outcomes
With these assumptions about preferences and the bargaining structure we can now
examine the set of "feasible constitutional outcomes." A feasible constitutional
outcome, is a point in the policy space such that if the Supreme Court chooses that
point as its decision in a constitutional issue, it will not be reversed by the House,
the Senate and the State Legislatures. That is, any proposal to reverse such decision
will be voted down by at least one of the three legislative bodies. To define the set
of feasible constitutional outcomes, let us start by defining the contract curve
between any two players. A point is on the contract curve between two players, if a
deviation from that point implies a reduction in the utility level of at least one of
the players. Thus, it represents all those points in the policy space that the
players could reach if they would bargain in isolation. Let the contract curve
between two players, I and J, be C(I,J). It is straightforward to see that the set of
If the Supreme Court would try, after being reversed, to again impose its
previous decision, a constitutional conflict will develop. Both houses of Congress
and the State Legislatures could then support a further constitutional amendment to
either overrule the Supreme Court, or to further limit its power. See Washy (1988)
and Casper (1976) for discussions of the constitutional implications of a "ruling-
response -ruling- response" sequence. We assume that the threat of further
constitutional amendments is strong enough to deter the Court from engaging in a
constitutional "ruling-response-ruling-response" sequence.
feasible constitutional outcomes includes all the points in the region delineated by
(and including the points on) the three contract curves between the House and the
Senate, the House and the State Legislatures and the Senate and the State
Legislatures. See Figure 1. Call that set W(H,S,SL).
Any Supreme Court decision that does not lie in the set W(H,S,SL), will then be
reversed by a Congress- initiated constitutional amendment. A decision on the boundary
or inside W(H,S,SL) cannot be reversed, since such a move will necessarily make at
least one of the three legislative bodies worse off. Consider, for example, a Supreme
Court constitutional decision on the contract curve between the House and the State
Legislatures. Consider now a proposal to reverse that decision, shifting the
constitutional interpretation strictly inside W(H,S,SL) and towards the ideal point of
the State Legislatures. Such a move, while making the State Legislatures, and perhaps
the Senate, strictly better off, makes the House strictly worse off. Thus, the House
will not support that constitutional amendment, and the Supreme Court decision will
stand. Similar reasoning shows that a decision inside V(H,S,SL) cannot be reversed
through a constitutional amendment.
Stable Constitutional Equilibria
Since any point in the set of feasible constitutional outcomes can be an
equilibrium, we now discuss which of those are stable constitutional equilibria. A
stable constitutional equilibrium is a point such that no party to the bargaining
process can successfully bring about an alternative outcome. We claim that the only
stable constitutional equilibria are those points in W(H,S,SL) such that maximize the
Supreme Court utility. In other words, a stable constitutional equilibrium is such
that any other point in W(H.S.SL) cannot make the Supreme Court better off. 9 To prove
9 Formally, X* is a stable constitutional equilibrium, if X* G {X/X - Argmax
U^Cx)
,
s.t. xeW(H,S,SL) } , where U^Cx) represents the utility function of the Supreme
Court.
the claim, recall that we already showed that only a feasible constitutional outcome
is a candidate for an equilibrium. Thus, consider a current constitutional
interpretation in W(H,S,SL) such that by a slight change the Supreme Court could be
made better off, while still remaining in W(H,S,SL). By making such change, the
Supreme Court can improve its utility without risking being reversed. Thus, by the
same logic, the Supreme Court will make its final decision such that it maximizes its
own utility while being in the set of feasible constitutional outcomes.
We can then state the following Proposition:
Proposition 1: a) If SC G W(H,S,SL), then SC is a stable constitutional equilibrium.
b) If SC £ W(H,S,SL), then the stable constitutional equilibrium is on
the boundary of W(H,S,SL).
The first result simply states that if the ideal point of the Supreme Court is
located inside the set of feasible outcomes, then through judicial intervention, the
Supreme Court will make its ideal point the constitutional equilibrium. If, however,
SC is outside the set of feasible equilibria, then the stable constitutional
equilibrium is on a contract curve between any two of the three legislative actors.
To prove the Proposition, consider first the case where the Supreme Court's ideal
point is strictly inside W(H,S,SL) as SC X is in Figure 1. Then by definition, any
move away from SC
X
will make at least one of the three legislative actors worse off,
and thus will be vetoed by either the State Legislatures or one of the houses of
Congress. Thus, if the Supreme Court makes a constitutional decision that essentially
determines its own ideal point as the current constitutional interpretation, it
becomes a stable equilibrium.
Consider now the case where the Supreme Court ideal point is outside W(H,S,SL), as
SC2 is in Figure 1. A Supreme Court decision that falls outside W(.) would generate
proposals for constitutional amendments which can actually carry the support from the
8
three legislative bodies. Thus, an amendment will bring the constitutional
equilibrium inside W(
.
) . Consider, instead a Supreme Court decision which is at the
boundary of W(.). Then, no further constitutional amendments can develop. Any
movement away from the Supreme Court decision, will make at least one legislative
actor worse off, and hence it will be vetoed. Since the Supreme Court is better off
at the boundary of W(.) than strictly inside W(
. ) , the stable constitutional
equilibrium must be on the boundary of W(
. ) , proving the Proposition.
We can now see the discretion that the Supreme Court has in interpreting the
Constitution. In particular, if the ideal points of the three legislative bodies are
far apart, then the set of feasible constitutional outcomes is very large, and it is
very probable that the Supreme Court could implement its own constitutional vision,
independently of Congress, the State Legislatures and public opinion as well. The
Supreme Court discretion, however, is reduced when the issue is not of a
constitutional nature. In that case, all that takes to reverse a Supreme Court
decision is an agreement between the House and the Senate, without the State
Legislatures having to agree to it. Thus, as in Gely and Spiller (1989b), the set of
feasible legislative equilibria shrinks from W(H,S,SL) to the contract curve between
the House and the Senate
.
10
What seems, then, to differentiate statutory from constitutional decisions is not
only the supermajorities required to reverse a constitutional decision, but perhaps
more importantly, that the constitutional amendment has to have the support of a third
actor, namely, the State Legislatures.
Comparative Statics
We can now explore the implications of this model for the evolution of the Supreme
10 This assumes that the President cannot veto the legislation, which is in
accordance to our assumptions about the composition of the House and the Senate.
Court's interpretation of the constitution. There are two cases to consider. First,
changes in the preferences of the legislative bodies, holding constant the preferences
(or the composition) of the Supreme Court. Second, changes in the preferences of the
Supreme Court, holding constant the preferences of the legislative bodies. 11
Electoral Changes
Electoral changes will get translated into changes in the ideal points of all
three legislative bodies. Consider for example, a marginal change in the electorate
that gets translated in a change in the ideal point of the House of Representative,
without substantial changes in the Senate or in the State Legislatures (see Figure
2). 12 There are three cases to consider in exploring whether such an electoral change
will have an impact on the constitutional equilibrium. First, if the ideal point of
the Supreme Court is strictly inside the set of feasible equilibria (SC X in Figure 2),
then such a change will have no effect on the status quo, 13 and the ideal point of the
Supreme Court remains as the only stable constitutional outcome. Second, if the ideal
point of the Supreme Court was originally outside the set of feasible equilibria, then
from Proposition 1 we know that all stable equilibria have to be on the boundary of
W(H,S,SL), that is, they have to be on a contract curve between two of the legislative
bodies. Assume that the initial equilibrium is on the contract curve between the
Senate and the State Legislatures (as is the case when the ideal point of the Supreme
11 When discussing changes in preferences, we do not necessarily mean that
either the justices or congressmen change their actual preferences. Personnel changes
in the Court and in the legislative bodies may translate in those bodies changing
their ideal points. These personnel changes, however, do not have to reflect
electoral changes. For example, personnel changes in key committees, which may arise
because of retirement or death, may have a large impact on the preferences of the
Houses of Congress.
12 Because of the nature of the composition of the House, Senate and State
Legislatures, such a change is not unreasonable. On this see footnote 14.
1 We assume here that the change in the electorate preferences is not so large
as to bring the status quo outside the new W(H,S,SL).
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Court is SC2 , as in Figure 2). This occurs when the ideal points of the House and the
Supreme Court are on different sides of C(S,SL). Then, again, a marginal change in
the ideal point of the House has no effect on the equilibrium. Third, consider the
case where the original equilibrium is on a contract curve involving the House (as
would be the case if the ideal point of the Supreme Court is SC3 in Figure 2) . In
this case, a marginal change in the ideal point of the House will have an impact on
the equilibrium. In particular, since the new stable constitutional equilibrium will
be on the new contract curve, the change in the preferences of the House will get
translated in a change in the interpretation of the Constitution.
Because the composition of the three legislative bodies differ substantially,
there could very well be large changes in the electorate that are translated to very
different degrees into the ideal points of the legislative bodies. For example, a
move in the electorate towards supporting more particularistic federal regulatory
programs would be translated first in the House of Representatives and only later in
the Senate and the State Legislatures. 1 * If, however, the preferences of the Supreme
Court are against particularistic programs, it may be able to block, on constitutional
grounds, any legislation that is intended to promote particularistic federal programs.
Only when the preferences of all three legislative bodies change in a similar
direction is that the Supreme Court may have to adjust and follow the electorate in
supporting those programs. In Section II we claim that this was the process
14 The rationale for such differential effect is the nature of the regional
basis of the constituencies underlying each legislative body. The House is more
representative of the urban, and northeastern, sectors of the country than the Senate.
Thus, urban, and industrial interest groups will have a stronger representation in the
House than in the Senate. On the other hand, each Representative's constituency tends
to be more narrowly defined than that of a Senator, thus making each Representative
more attuned to particularistic interests than Senators. The same reasoning would
suggest that, at least until 1962, State Legislatures were even less responsive to
particularistic interests than Senators. However, following its decision in Baker vs
.
Carr, the Supreme Court required that State Legislatures' apportionments be related to
current population (see 369 US 186 (1962)).
11
underlying the Supreme Court initial opposition to New Deal programs, and its later
reversal
.
Observe that if the issue at hand was not constitutional but statutory, then the
set of feasible equilibria would consist of C(H,S), and thus any change in the ideal
point of the House (or of the Senate) should get translated into a change in the
political equilibrium. Thus, the Supreme Court necessarily has more discretionary
power in constitutional rather than in statutory issues.
Changes in the Composition of the Supreme Court
Consider now changes in the composition of the Supreme Court without a
simultaneous change in the electorate. The change may be discrete or gradual. A
discrete change may occur when the appointment of a new justice changes the nature of
the median justice. 15 A gradual change may occur when the new justice and the
retiring justice share the same ideological views, but with some minor differences.
The location of the equilibrium is very sensitive to the preferences of the Supreme
Court justices. Marginal changes in the Supreme Court's preferences will, usually,
get translated in marginal changes in constitutional interpretations. 16 On the other
hand, discrete changes in Supreme Court preferences may imply very large changes in
the constitutional equilibrium. To see this, consider a discrete change in the ideal
point of the Supreme Court from SC2 to SC 3 in Figure 2. The resulting constitutional
equilibrium may change from one side of the political spectrum to the other. We can
then state:
Proposition 2: (a) Holding constant the preferences of the Supreme Court, marginal
changes in the preferences of a single legislative body do not
15 That could be the case of a divided court with the retiring justice being
from an opposite ideology than the new appointed justice.
1 The qualification to this statement arises because of the possibility of
corner solutions, i.e. when the equilibrium is at the ideal point of one of the
legislative bodies.
12
change the initial constitutional equilibrium unless the original
equilibrium is located on a contract curve involving that
particular legislative body.
(b) Holding constant the preferences of all legislative bodies,
changes in the ideal point of the Supreme Court almost always
imply changes in the constitutional equilibrium.
To summarize, in our model, the way the Supreme Court interprets the constitution
depends not only on its own ideological believes, but also on the preferences of the
electorate as are translated in the composition of Congress and of the State
Legislatures. Changes in the electorate may be accommodated more or less rapidly by
the Supreme Court, depending on its own ideological preferences, but also on the
nature and magnitude of the changes in the preferences of the three legislative
bodies
.
With this framework we now analyze the constitutional conflict surrounding
Roosevelt's Court Packing Plan.
III. Roosevelt's Court Packing Plan
Many of the New Deal measures adopted by President Roosevelt after taking office in
1933 were based on the Commerce Clause, since it was the constitutional power most
directly concerned with business and economic activity. 17 Roosevelt's New Deal
measures included extensive reform and relief programs in areas like banking, finance,
labor, agriculture, and manufacturing. The Emergency Banking Act, the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, and the National Industrial Recovery Act, all constituted far reaching
assertions of federal authority over national economic life than what the country had
experienced up to that point. There were judicial precedents which could be expanded
either to sustain or to reject this new trend in federal control. 18
The question of the constitutionality of the New Deal legislation was to be
17 See, Gunther, (1985).




decided by a Court which had not changed greatly since the mid- twenties , and with the
members being well defined as either liberals or conservatives. 19 Justices Cardozo,
Brandeis, and Stone, could be counted to vote in support of most New Deal measures.
On the other hand Van Devanter, Sutherland, McReynolds and Butler were certain to vote
against. The "swinging" votes were Justice Roberts and Chief Justice Hughes.
Earlier in the New Deal period, the Court gave the government encouraging signs by
upholding a couple of state laws regulating economic activity. In Home Bldg. and Loan
Association v. Blaisdell
.
20 the Court upheld a Minnesota statute declaring a limited
moratorium on mortgage payments. In so holding, Chief Justice Hughes argued that "an
emergency, although could not create power, could furnish the justification for the
exercise of power." 21 The case is important because it gives support to the
proposition that the Constitution does not have to "be read with literal exactness
like a mathematical formula." 22 Two months later Justice Roberts wrote the Court
opinion in Nebbia v. New York
.
23 in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
New York statute setting up a state milk control board and empowering the board to fix
maximum and minimum milk process. Although there where precedents which could have
support a reversal of the law, 2 * Justice Roberts preferred to ignore those, and
instead argued that a State was, in general, free to adopt towards any business,
19 See, for example, Kelly and Harbison, (1970); Wasby (1988) and Novak (1982)
20 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
21 Home Bldg. . at p. 426
22 Home Bldg. at p. 428.
23 291 U.S. 502 (1934)
2
* Tyson and Bros, v. Banton . 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (holding unconstitutional a
state law regulating theater ticket prices as not falling within the categories
affecting the public interest); New State Ice Co .v. Liebman . 285 U.S. 262 (1932)
(holding unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute regulating the manufacture and sale of ice)
14
"whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare." 25
Notwithstanding these two cases the Court proceeded, after January 1935, to struck
down several major pieces of New Deal legislation. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan
.
26
the Court held the "hot oil" provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act of
193327 to be an excessive delegation of legislative power to the executive and
therefore unconstitutional. The "hot oil" provision allowed the President to prohibit
the transportation of petroleum products produced in violation of state statutes.
Although the Act also contained a provision which allowed the President to establish
and enforce codes of fair competition, the Court did not decide on the
constitutionality of such provision. Thus, by relying instead on the "hot oil"
provision, the Court left an easy way out for Congress, since the particular defect in
the NIRA could have been solved by legislative prohibition of all interstate shipments
of "hot oil." A mater of concern for Congress and the President was, however, that
for the first time the Court held as unconstitutional a statute which delegated
quasi-legislative authority to the executive. 28 These worries proved to be true not
long thereafter. In Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States
.
29 the Court invalidated
the NIRA in its entirety, this time relying on the unconstitutionality of the "codes
of unfair competition" provision. The Court found the NIRA to be an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the President, and an abuse of congressional power
25 291 U.S. 502, at p. 537.
26 295 U.S. 388 (1935).
27 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
28 Nowak, et al
. (1983).
29 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
15
under Che Commerce Clause. 30
In the next year the Court dissipated any remaining doubts as to its opposition to
the extension of federal power to certain areas that it believed to be solely within
the jurisdiction of the individual states. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co. . 31 for
example, the Court frustrated-. Congress' attempt to regulate labor relations. The
Bituminous Coal Conservation <-' :t of 193532 required coal producers to follow the
maximum hour labor terms negotiated between the miners and the producers of more that
two thirds of the annual national tonnage production for the preceding calendar
year. 33 The majority opinion held that the Act was an unconstitutional delegation of
power to private persons. 34 Further, the Court found that the regulation of wages and
working hours of mining and production employees by the federal government was outside
the commerce power. 35 Although the Court upheld some federal legislation during this
period, 36 it was clear that it was "not headed on a course of deference to legislative
judgments concerning economic and social relationships." 37
By the end of 1936 there was, then, a bitterly divided Court in confrontation with
both the President and Congress. In November 1936 the Democratic Party won an
30 See Gely and Spiller (1989a) for a "self-interest" rationale for the Supreme
Court to enforce the constitutional separation of executive and legislative powers.
31 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
32 49 Stat. 991.
33 49 Stat. 991, Sec. 4, Part III, Subdiv (g)
.
3
* Carter , at p. 292.
35 Id. , at p. 310.
36 Eg., Norman v. Baltimore & 0. Rv.Co. . 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (where the Court
upheld federal legislation abrogating the gold clauses in contracts as a reasonable
measure to regulate the national currency)
.
37 See Nowak et. al., at p. 160.
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overwhelming victory at the polls. Although President Roosevelt had not openly
attacked the Court during the campaign, his clear victory in the election constituted
a mandate to pursue further New Deal measures, including to reform the Court if
needed.
This constitutional confrontation prompted the proposal of various measures to
undercut the Court's role in the debate. The most famous of these was President
Roosevelt's "Court Packing Plan." 38 The plan provided that whenever any federal
judge who had served ten or more years and failed to retire within six months after
reaching his seventieth birthday, the President could appoint an additional judge to
that same Court. 39 No more that fifty additional judges in all might be appointed
under the Act, and the maximum size of the Supreme Court was fixed at fifteen.
Roosevelt's plan was but one in a series of proposals raised to influence the
direction of the Court. Several bills and resolutions were introduced in Congress,
both before and after Roosevelt's plan was made public in February 5, 1937 (see Table
1) . Some extreme proposals were made so as to, by way of a constitutional amendment,
abolish the Court's power to declare the acts of Congress unconstitutional. Other
less drastic measures were introduced requiring two-thirds or more of the justices
concurring in any decision holding unconstitutional a federal legislation. Still
other proposals suggested simply limiting the appellate power of the Court in certain
constitutional issues. Altogether, these proposals signaled a strong sentiment in
Congress that the Court had overstepped its own authority. None of these proposals
Roosevelt's plan was not the first "court packing" incident in the history of
the Supreme Court. In 1869, President Grant promoted (and was implemented by
Congress) an increase in the number of Supreme Court Justices from 7 to 9 as a way to
ensure Supreme Court support of the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acus. See
Kelly and Harbison (1970, p. 480-86).
At that time, all four traditionally conservative justices were above seventy
years of age.
17
were, however, enacted into law. Still it must have been clear to the members of the
Court that their decisions were not taken lightly by Congressmen.
Although it first appeared that the plan would be enacted into law,* several
events decided the issue against the administration. Most significantly was the fact
that the Court "reformed" itself. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish . the Court
upheld a state minimum wage law.* 1 Two weeks later, the Court also decided NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. . *2 in which it upheld the constitutionality of the
National Labor Relations Act, imposing extensive and detailed controls upon
labor-management relations in industry.
This change in the Court's direction was crucial in the future course of federal
regulation of economic activity.* 3 The striking feature of this reversal, however, is
that it was taken without a change in the composition of the Court. Most explanations
offered in this regard point at Roosevelt's Court Packing Plan as the reason for the
Court's shift in policy. The Court Packing Plan, however, as discussed above, was not
the only or necessarily the primary threat facing the Court, but one of a series of
events that started years before.
At the time of the New Deal controversy, the Court's composition had remained
fairly stable since the mid-twenties (see Table 2). The "old" conservatives (Van
Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler), together with two of the new comers
(Chief Justice Hughes and Roberts), combined to struck down new deal legislation.
The personnel in Congress and the Executive, however, had been experiencing large
changes. During 1929-1930, both houses of Congress, as well as the President were
*° Kelly and Harbison, (1970 p. 763) and, Leuchtenburg, (1971).
A1 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
*2 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
* 3 Currie (1985), Nowak et al., (1983), Novak (1982).
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Republican (see Table 3). The next Congress, however, was divided. The House became
Democrat while the Senate remained Republican. The 73th Congress saw the Democrats
gaining a super-majority (more than two- thirds) in the House, but less than that in
the Senate. By 1935 both Houses of Congress were controlled by the Democrats by more
than a two- thirds margin.** The 75th Congress saw this lead became even wider.
Similar changes were developing at the Committee level. While the chairmen of the
Senate and House Judiciary committees did not change from 1933 through 1938, * 5 the
Senate Judiciary committee experienced a large increase in its Democratic majority.
While in 1933-34 the committee was composed of ten Democrats and seven Republicans
(with one vacancy), in 1935-36 the Democratic majority increased to eleven to five
(with two vacancies), and then, following the 1936 elections, it increased to 14 to
four, with no vacancies. On the other hand, the composition of the House Committee
was relatively stable through the period, with a Democratic majority of 18 to seven
during 1933-36 and of 19 to six following the 1936 elections.
While these changes were occurring at the federal level, a similar transformation
was taking place at the state legislatures. During 1932-34, out of 48 state
legislatures, twenty six were controlled by Democrats, twelve by Republicans, and ten
were internally divided or had a non-partisan format.* 6 With the 1936 election,
however, the number of legislatures controlled by Democrats increased to 33, while
those controlled by Republicans decreased to only 6, and the other 9 states'
** The Southern Democrats seem to have, in general, supported the Court Packing
Plan in 1937. For example, press reports show that only 4 Southern Democrat Senators
were undecided. Assuming they were against the Court Packing Plan, there is still a
supermajority at the Senate. Assuming the same ratio holds among the Representatives,
the Democrats also have a comfortable supermajority at the House.
* 5 From 1933 to 1937 the chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary committees
were, respectively, Senator Henry Ashurst (D. Ark), and Rep. Halton Sumners (D. Tx)
.
Because of the nature of State senatorial apportionment, most of the divided
legislatures had Republican senate majorities. See footnote 14.
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legislatures were not clearly defined (see Tables 4 and 5)
.
Several implications follow from these numbers. By 1935 the Democrats had
acquired a two thirds majority in both houses of Congress. Such a majority was enough
.under Article V, to initiate a constitutional amendment. At that time, however, the
state legislatures were not yet overwhelmingly Democrat. After the 1936 election,
however, the Democrats expanded their control in Congress and substantially increased
the number of states' legislatures where they held a majority (33 out of 48). To be
sure, 33 states were not enough to ratify a constitutional amendment (Article V
requires three-fourth of the states to ratify an amendment). However, since there
were 9 state legislatures that were divided, it is reasonable to expect that half of
those will support a constitutional amendment, thus providing more than the necessary
state support.
Our model would define the conflict in the following terms (see Figure 3) . The
constitutional conflict between Congress and the Supreme Court was based on the extent
of federal programs and federal regulatory policies. The initial equilibrium was one
with a low level of federal regulation and programs. It is reasonable to believe that
the Supreme Court justices found that initial equilibrium to their liking. Tables 3,4
and 5 suggest that during the whole period the House was in favor of a larger extent
of federal programs and regulation than the Senate, and similarly, the latter were in
favor of a larger extent than the State Legislatures. Furthermore, because federal
programs had a much more particularistic nature than federal regulation, it is
reasonable to assume that the House was in favor of more federal programs than of
federal regulation. The intensity of the relative preferences between programs and
regulation should be approximately the same for the State Legislatures as for the
Senate, with the latter demanding more of both. Thus the set of feasible
constitutional outcomes (see Figure 3), in the early 1930s, is large. The Supreme
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Court's decisions before 1937 suggest that it preferred a very small level of federal
programs and regulations. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that it was located closer
to the origin than the State Legislatures. Thus, the initial equilibrium, E
x
in
Figure 3, would be close to (for simplicity we assume it is) the ideal point of the
State Legislatures. During the 30' s, however, both the House and the Senate, and the
State Legislatures, moved their ideal points away from the status quo, towards a
larger federal role. As seen in Tables 3 to 5, initially the main changes developed
in the House. The equilibrium however, should move with the ideal point of the State
Legislatures, which seem to have showed a much smaller degree of change than that of
the House. Thus, for convenience, we assume that during the early 1930' s the only
moves occurred in the ideal point of the House. The elections of 1936, however,
drastically changed the set of feasible constitutional outcomes. Now the State
Legislatures, and the Senate, moved closer to the ideal point of the House, implying
that the initial status quo E 1 was untenable. The new stable equilibrium, E2 , implies
a much larger extent of federal programs and regulations. Had the Supreme Court tried
to maintain E
x
as the constitutional status quo, a constitutional amendment could have
been implemented, with the outcome being inside W(H,S,SL). Since the Supreme Court
prefers E2 to any other point in U(H,S,SL), it will preempt a constitutional amendment
by changing its interpretation of the constitution. Thus, the West Coast Hotel and
NLRB_decisions represent, in Figure 3, the shift from E1 to E2 .
To summarize, until late 1936, the opposition to the Supreme Court, while
vociferous in Congress, was not able to achieve a consensus to reverse the Court's
decisions since it lacked the support from the State Legislatures. Consequently, the
opposition did not represent a binding constraint to the Supreme Court. The
possibility of a Constitutional amendment, however, became real following the 1936
elections, at which time the Supreme Court reversed its previous decisions.
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The fact that West Coast Hotel v. Parrish was announced on March 29 1937, almost
two moths after Roosevelt's Court Packing Plan was made public (February, 1937), has
led several scholars to think that it was solely the Court Packing Plan and not the
events described above which caused the Court's shift.* 7 Although West Coast Hotel
was announced after the plan was made public, the vote on the case was taken two
months before, on December 1936. At that time Justice Roberts announced his change of
position to his fellow justices. Justice Stone's illness left the justices divided 4
to 4 on the decision and so prevented the publication of their decision at that
immediate time.* 8 Thus the shift in Justice Roberts' position occurred after the
election of 1936 but before the time of President Roosevelt's announcement.
IV. Final Comments
To summarize, the Court Packing Plan shows the relevant constraints that the
Supreme Court faces when making Constitutional decisions. These constraints are
substantially less stringent than those related to statutory interpretations. As in
the latter cases, however, the Supreme Court's power is limited by the interests and
preferences of the electorate, and the structure of Congress and the State
Legislatures. While the Supreme Court has substantial discretion in its
constitutional interpretations, changes in the preferences of the electorate will
translate in changes in the Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution. The
speed and the extent of the Supreme Court adaptation, however, depends both on the
Supreme Court ideological position, as well as on how unified Congress and the State
Legislatures are on the issue at hand. If the legislative bodies' preferences are
very similar, then the Supreme Court will not be able to delay a change in the
constitutional interpretation. Only when Congress and the State Legislatures are
* 7 See, Leuchtenburg (1971), p. 95.
48 Kelly and Harbison (1970, p. 764)
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divided is that the preferences of the Justices matter in interpreting the
Constitution.* 9
* 9 Adamany and Grossman (1983, p. 430) claim that "the modern Court's policies
and authority have been favored by an ideological minority . . . represented in a
substantial number of strategic positions in the highly diffuse law-making structure
of the national government."
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TABLE 1
BILLS INTRODUCED TO REGULATE THE SUPREME COURT, 1937

































To regulate the Supreme Court in
connection with determining the
constitutionality of acts of
Congress and statutes of the various
states.
Providing that seven or more
justices of the Supreme Court shall
concur to hold an act of Congress
unconstitutional
.
To limit the power of the Court
respecting legislation of Congress.
To provide that two -thirds of the
Supreme Court shall concur in order
to invalidate an act of Congress as
contrary to the Constitution.
To amend the Constitution to provide
that any law held unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court shall be valid
if approved by the electorate or
reenacted by Congress.
Authorizing an increased number of
Federal judges and Supreme Court
Justices by appointments where
judges attain the age of 70 and do
not retire.
To increase the number of Justices
in the Supreme Court.
(Same as H 4417) .
To provide for the retirement of
Justices of the Supreme Court,
setting the age at seventy- two after
ten years of service and providing
for continuance of the same salary.
To amend the Constitution to provide
that any law held unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court shall be valid
if reenacted by Congress.
H 5172
March 1, 1937
O'Connor To require concurrence of two- thirds
(Montana) of the Supreme Court before an Act









To amend the Constitution to provide
that any law held unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court shall be valid
if reenacted by Congress.
To amend the Constitution providing
for a membership of nine Justices, one
of whom shall be designated by the
President as Chief Justice.
H 5485
March 9, 1937
Fish To provide that the Supreme Court
shall not invalidate an Act of
Congress except by a decision of
two -thirds of the Justices.
S.J. Res. 98
March 11, 1937
O'Mahoney To amend the Constitution to provide
That no inferior court shall declare
law of the U.S. unconstitutional and
that the Supreme Court shall have a
two- third majority of opinions to















To amend Article III, sec. 1 of the
Constitution to provide 1) for a
voluntary retirement at full pay for
Justices reaching the age of 70, and
compulsory retirement for Justices
reaching the age of 75; 2) ... 3) for
a two- thirds majority of Justices
concurring in order to invalidate an
Act of Congress.
To amend the Constitution to provide
that Federal judges and Supreme
Court Justices shall hold office for
nine years only and that the
compensation of such judges and
Justices shall be subject to taxation
under any law passed by Congress.
To provide for the concurrence of
two- thirds majority in holding an
Act of Congress unconstitutional.
(Same as H 5485).
To amend the Constitution to fix the
membership of the Supreme Court at




three -fourths annual pay of any
justice or lower court judge who had
attained the age of 72, and has been
on the bench for ten consecutive
years; and to require a two -thirds
majority of opinions of the Justices
of the Court to invalidate an Act of
Congress.
To amend the Constitution to fix the
number of Justices at nine, to provide
two -thirds concurrence of opinions to
declare an Act of Congress
unconstitutional; and, to provide for





Providing that the Court shall not
hold any State or Federal law
unconstitutional except with the

























To amend the Constitution to provide
for the validation through reenactment
by Congress of any law adjudged
unconstitutional by the Court, and to
require that the Court render an
opinion on the constitutionality of
Acts of Congress when the Act so
provides.
Proposing a constitutional amendment
relating to the number, tenure and
compensation of judges.
To amend the Constitution to fix the
number of Supreme Court Justices.
Amending the Constitution to provide
for the appointment of additional
Justices.
Authorizing the President to nominate
two additional Justices to the Court.
(Same as H 7154)
(Same as H.J. Res. 250) June 9,1937.
Providing for retirement.
TABLE 2
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES DURING THE NEW DEAL PERIOD
JUSTICES 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938 1940 APPOINTED BY
Willis Van Devanter ] Taft(R)
James C. McReynolds - ] Wilson(D)
Louis D. Brandeis ] Wilson(D)
George Sutherland ] Harding(R)
Pierce Butler ] Harding(R)
Harlan S. Stone Coolidge(R)
Charles Hughes [ ] Hoover (R)
Owen J . Roberts [ Hoover (R)
Benjamin Cardozo [ ] Hoover (R)
TABLE 3
COMPOSITION OF THE US CONGRESS DURING THE NEW DEAL PERIOD
YEAR
HOUSE SENATE






D 331 R 89 D 76 R 16 D
D 319 R 103 D 69 R 25 D
D 310 R 117 D 60 R 35 D
D 220 R 214 R 48 D 47 R




COMPOSITION OF STATES LEGISLATURES, 1932-1935
SENATE HOUSE
STATE MAJ. MIN. MAJ. MIN. SUMMARY
Alabama D 35 R D 100 R 3 D/D
Arizona D 19 R D 59 R 4 D/D
Arkansas D 35 R D 100 R D/D
California R 35 D 5 R 55 D 25 R/R
Colorado D 29 R 6 D 50 R 15 D/D
Conn D 17 R 15 R 180 D 88 D/R
Delaware R 9 D 8 R 23 D 12 R/R
Florida D 38 R D 94 R 1 D/D
Georgia D 51 R D 205 R D/D
Idaho D 36 R 8 D 52 R 11 D/D
Illinois D 32 R 18 D 84 R 69 D/D
Indiana D 43 R 7 D 91 R 9 D/D
Iowa R 26 D 25 D 58 R 50 R/D
Kansas R 23 D 17 R 65 D 60 R/R
Kentucky D 25 R 13 D 74 R 26 D/D
Louisiana D 39 R D 100 R D/D
Maine R 22 D 11 R 96 D 55 R/R
Maryland D 23 R 6 D 91 R 27 D/D
Mass
.
R 21 D 19 R 143 D 88 R/R
Michigan R 21 D 11 D 50 R 50 R/-
Minn. Non Partisan
Mississippi D 49 R D 140 R D/D
Missouri D 27 R 7 D 102 R 48 D/D
Montana R 33 D 21 D 68 R 34 R/D
Nebraska D 22 R 11 D 68 R 32 D/D
Nevada R 9 D 7 D 25 R 12 R/D
N.H. R 16 D 8 R 226 D 192 R/R
N.J. R 15 D 6 R 34 D 26 R/R
N.M. D 20 R 4 D 40 R 8 D/D
N.Y. D 29 R 22 D 77 R 73 D/D
N.C. D 48 R 2 D 107 R 13 D/D
N.D. R 44 D 5 R 103 D 10 R/R
Ohio D 16 R 16 D 84 R 51 -/D
Oklahoma D 39 R 5 D 112 R 5 D/D
Oregon R 22 D 8 R 42 D 17 R/R
Penn. R 43 D 7 D 117 R 88 R/D
R.I. R 27 D 14 R 50 D 49 R/R
S.C. D 46 R D 124 R D/D
S.D. D 32 R 17 D 64 R 49 D/D
Tenn. D 28 R 5 D 81 R 18 D/D
Texas D 31 R D 150 R D/D
Utah R 13 D 10 R 51 D 9 R/R
Vermont R 22 D 8 R 193 D 48 R/R
Virginia D 38 R 2 D 93 R 5 D/D
Washington D 25 R 21 D 91 R 8 D/D
W.Virginia D 23 R 7 D 72 R 22 D/D
Wisconsin R 24 D 8 D 59 R 38 R/D
Wyoming R 15 D 12 D 38 R 18 R/D
Total: 26 D/D 12 R/R 10 mixed I
COMPOSITION OF STATES LEGISLATURES, 1936-1937
SENATE HOUSE
STATE MAJ. MIN. MAJ. MIN. SUMMARY
Alabama D 35 R D 106 R 1 D/D
Arizona D 19 R D 50 R 1 D/D
Arkansas D 35 R D 98 R 2 D/D
California R 25 D 15 D 47 R 33 R/D
Colorado D 28 R 6 D 49 R 15 D/D
Conn D 26 R 9 R 167 D 100 D/R
Delaware R 11 D 5 D 16 R 10 R/D
Florida D 38 R D 95 R D/D
Georgia D 51 R D 203 R 2 D/D
Idaho D 33 R 11 D 50 R 9 D/D
Illinois D 32 R 17 D 85 R 68 D/D
Indiana D 38 R 12 D 77 R 23 D/D
Iowa R 28 D 22 D 54 R 54 R/-
Kansas R 25 D 15 R 74 D 51 R/R
Kentucky D 26 R 12 D 67 R 33 D/D
Louisiana D 39 R D 100 R D/D
Maine R 29 D 4 R 124 D 27 R/R
Maryland D 18 R 11 D 95 R 23 D/D
Mass. R 26 D 14 R 135 D 103 R/R
Michigan D 17 R 15 D 60 R 40 D/D
Minn. Non Part:Lsan
Mississippi D 49 R D 140 R D/D
Missouri D 31 R 3 D 105 R 45 D/D
Montana D 29 R 27 D 81 R 21 D/D
Nebraska Non Part:Lsan
Nevada D 11 R 3 D 30 R 9 D/D
N.H. R 16 D 8 R 188 D 176 R/R
N.J. R 11 D 10 D 39 R 21 R/D
N.M. D 23 R 1 D 47 R 2 D/D
N.Y. D 29 R 22 R 76 D 73 D/R
N.C D 48 R 2 D 112 R 8 D/D
N.D. R 34 D 14 R 88 D 25 R/R
Ohio D 31 R 5 D 105 R 33 D/D
Oklahoma D 44 R D 114 R 3 D/D
Oregon R 18 D 12 D 38 R 21 R/D
Penn. D 34 R 16 D 154 R 54 D/D
R.I. D 26 R 15 D 54 R 46 D/D
S.C. D 46 R D 124 R D/D
S.D. R 23 D 22 R 66 D 37 R/R
Term. D 29 R 4 D 81 R 18 D/D
Texas D 31 R D 150 R D/D
Utah D 22 R 1 D 56 R 4 D/D
Vermont D 22 R 8 D 204 R 39 D/D
Virginia D 40 R D 99 R D/D
Washington D 40 R 5 D 93 R 6 D/D
W.Virginia D 24 R 6 D 82 R 12 D/D
Wisconsinl D 9 R 8 D 31 R 21 D/D
Wyoming D 16 R 11 D 38 R 18 D/D
Total
:
33 D/D 6 R/R 10 mixed
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